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models.
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In the traditional literature on household labour supply there is an open
debate on whether a joint utility model or a "male chauvinist" model better
represent the real decision- making process. The necessary and sufficient
conditions of the two models differ greatly. The unitary model implies equal
cross-substitution effects on husband's and wife's labour supply with the
spouse's wage entering into individual leisure only as an adjustment to
income. The “male chauvinist” model considers independent utilities, but the
wife treats the husband's earnings only as property income. A more recent
approach, the "collective" model, has been tried, and some empirical
evidence using it is available
1. This model allows for different preference
structures to affect the simultaneous decision of husband and wife's labour
supply, and constrains individual labour supply and consumption to be Pareto
efficient given an arbitrary income- sharing rule in any household budgetary
situation.
A common empirical result of the literature, including unitary and
collective models is that:
“the standard joint utility model seems inadequate when confronted with sharp
differences in the behaviour of families with and without children. An
augmented version which includes children as a joint consumption good and the
care of children as an alternative use of time seems a more promising
approach” (Lundberg, 1988, p. 231).
However, the empirical evidence by Fortin and Lacroix (1997) suggests
that even the collective model is inadequate in the case of young couples
with pre-school children.
In this paper we present a model that extends both the traditional
household utility framework (also called unitary framework) and the
collective one, to include pre-school children and then, following Fortin and
Lacroix (FL henceforth), we derive necessary and sufficient conditions to
test between the two models. The approach of the present paper is more
general than in FL, in that it deals with the presence of children in a
1  See Chiappori (1988) and Fortin and Lacroix (1997).3
household creating non-separabilities similar to those examined by the
literature on public goods and externalities.
Much of the recent literature on child care provides evidence of the
impact of changes in child care costs on women's participation decisions.
Few papers estimate a structural model of the two simultaneous decisions,
childbearing and labour market participation
2. They focus only on the
mother, and they consider the other family members' earnings as exogenous.
Our aim is a joint model of the labour supply decisions of both spouses and
of the demand for child care to examine the impact of the child care problem
on the decision to work.
In each model discussed below, the presence of pre-school children is
assumed to affect the preference structure of the family in a paternalistic
way, that is both parents care about the quality of the care that their children
receive. The quality of time is the result of the maximisation of a production
function, in which the inputs are the time that parents spend with the child,
the time occupied by informal child care, such as that provided by relatives
and the time of formal child care (nurseries and crèches). These are assumed
to be perfect substitutes for one another; this assumption constrains decisions
on the wife’s participation and use of child care to be efficiently driven by the
hourly cost of each input only. Extending this approach to consider more
flexible degrees of substitution would provide additional information on the
role played by preferences in this simultaneous decision.
The empirical application uses the 1993 Italian Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy. From a sample
of 8,089 households interviewed in 1993, we select a sub-sample of married
couples with pre-school children. The empirical model is an application of
the generalised Heckman two-step procedure to the estimation of two labour
supply functions, correcting the wife's hours of work equation for the
selection bias created by the joint decision on the labour market participation
and use of child care.
The econometric specification is in line with the main literature; however,
we also extend the labour supply estimation to the sub-sample of households
that work but do not buy any formal child care, by considering an
2  See in particular Michalopoulos et al. (1992) and Ribar (1995).4
endogenous switching selection model. We then test the restrictions derived
from both the unitary and the collective model.
The paper is organised in four substantive sections. In Section 2 the
unitary and the collective models with a household production function are
analysed, and an unrestricted labour supply system is introduced to derive a
series of nested tests for each case. Section 3 discusses the stochastic
specification and Section 4 the sample selection and its main characteristics.
Section 5 presents the empirical results. The concluding remarks are given in
Section 6.
2. A Theoretical Framework for Household Labour Supply with Child Care
What does the problem of time allocation for a young couple with
children aged 0-5 look like? A well- known result in the econometric
literature is that the labour supply of this particular demographic group
differs remarkably from the rest of the population. The presence of very
young children engenders strong non-separabilities in the couple's work
decisions.
This section introduces an interpretation of the decision- making process
of this group, both in the context of a standard household utility function and
in the collective framework, and derives a set of testable restrictions for each
case.
In trying to model the simultaneous decisions on labour supply,
consumption, and quality of time, the literature has relied on one important
simplifying assumption. Because existing data-sets give child- care costs only
for working women, papers on child care assume that there is no distinction
between pure leisure and time spent caring for children. This does indeed
reduce the number of variables considered; but it does not explain why a
non-working mother would prefer to buy child care, even during the child's
early years.
Since in our sample we actually observe all four possible combinations
derived from the participation and formal child care decisions (i.e. working
wives both buying and not buying child care; and housewives buying and not
buying child care), we keep the two variables, leisure and the mother’s time
spent with the children, separate. Hence, we consider preferences as defined
over consumption, pure leisure and the children’s quality of life. That is: we5
make the standard assumption of disutility from work plus the assumption
that both parents care about the quality of time their children receive.
The value for the quality of time is obtained by maximising a production
function whose inputs are the time that parents spend with the child, the time
provided by other relatives (not necessarily living in the house) and the time
of child care that is purchased. We call the first two inputs “informal”, and
the third “formal” child care, the latter consists mainly in nursery schools
and crèches, and nannies. All types of child care are assumed to be perfect
substitutes.
In order to derive a series of nested tests, both the unitary and the
collective approach are compared with an unrestricted system of household
labour supplies.
The functional form chosen in both approaches is the linear expenditure
system (LES); the choice is driven by the search for a more flexible
functional form than the quadratic indirect utility, strongly limited by the
implied linear marginal utility, used in FL. The LES
3 keeps the algebra
relatively simple and its degree of flexibility depends on the number of goods
considered (i.e., the number of coefficients to estimate in the labour supply
equations).
2.1. The Unitary Case
Assuming a household utility having Stone Geary form, defined over
individual consumption C C
m f ,  (the superscript m designates the husband, f
the wife), leisure l l
m f ,  and the quality of child care Q
c, we consider a utility
maximisation problem as follows:
3 The LES form is monotonic in the wage rate: an LES is always either forward-sloping or
backward- sloping, depending on whether the level of income is higher or lower than the
subsistence level. See Michalopoulos et al. (1992) for empirical evidence of a structural model
with the same functional form.6
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where di ‡ 0 (i=1,...,5);  ( ) g g
j j = z  (j=m,f), the function of demographics,
defines the minimum committed level of consumption, the other three goods
having a subsistence level fixed at zero. The price of consumption has been
normalised to 1, and w w p p
m f cc o , , ,  are respectively the individual wage rates
and the hourly prices for formal child care (the time measured by t
cc) and for
that provided by relatives (t
o). The constraints are the household budget,
and the time endowments for each parent and each child; all constraints have
to hold.
( ) Q t t t t
c m f o o cc = + + + d  is a production function whose inputs are the time
each parent spends with the children (t
f and t
m), the care provided by other
adults in the family if available (d
o is a dummy for availability taking either 1
or 0), and the time of formal child care purchased. All these inputs are
perfect substitutes for one another
4.
It is assumed that  { } w w w p p
m m f cc o „ min , , , ; together with the perfect
substitution assumption, this precludes considering the father’s care as an
efficient form of child care. Given the budget constraint, therefore, the
decision on the form of child care is driven by the other three prices:
w p p
f cc o , , . The time the mother spends with the child has an opportunity
cost equal to her expected wage. Moreover, since relatives providing child
care are usually retired, we can fix p
o = 0.
5
4  Because of the assumption of perfect substitutability, Q
c  can only take a constant value, i.e. the
child’s total time endowment.
5  The drawback of this assumption is that whenever informal care is available, it is always
preferred to the other child care types, it is unrationed and there is no shadow cost. However,
since the data set used here does not include such a variable, we only consider it as a potential
option, and do not develop its analysis too far.7
To exclude the case of l
f = 0 , which would give an infinite disutility, we
impose T T
f c > , so that the mother can always enjoy a bit of leisure.
The final choice of formal, informal or maternal child care is determined
by the availability of other adults, individual preferences on leisure and
consumption, and the structure of the labour market and the child care
market (we do not specify this decision-making process in great detail). The
same variables influence the mother’s decision to participate in the labour
market, and whenever they are favourable, the labour supply system of a
household with two working parents that solves the maximisation problem
(1) is the following:
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where  ( ) ( ) g g g = +
f m z z  and since the coefficient d5 in the household utility
function in (1) is always multiplied by a constant, we have used the
normalisation  di i= ￿ =
1
4
1. In (2), the lack of informal child care imposes an
extra cost when both parents work.
Moreover, changes in non- labour income and in the spouse’s potential
earnings are constrained to have the same effect on individual labour
supplies.
2.2. The Collective Model
Underlying the collective model is the idea that each person with power to
decide in a family has a well-defined preference set and individual choices are
Pareto-efficient. Following Chiappori (1988), the literature distinguishes
between models envisaging only the consumption of private goods, i.e.
goods consumed individually by each family member, and those allowing for
both private and public goods (those consumed in common). An example of
the general case with both private and public goods is:8
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subject to the household budget constraint. Here Q
C is a public good,
whereas consumption and individual leisure are private goods;  ( ) Y ￿  is an
exogenous function, homogeneous of degree zero in wage rates and
individual non-labour incomes, which means that the second fundamental
welfare theorem holds
6.
The problem under investigation here involves both public and private
goods (private consumption and leisure, but also the shared concern of both
parents caring for the children’s quality of life). This term creates non-
separabilities in the individual utilities. However, because it is assumed that
individual preferences are of the Stone-Geary type and that the times the
parents spend with the child are perfect substitutes and
{ } w w w p p
m m f cc o „ min , , , , t
m > 0 is never a Pareto-optimal solution. Thus the
aggregate problem can be decentralised into the following two problems, one
for the husband and one the wife:
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6  With this general approach one must choose either to test for it since the derived aggregate
demand for consumption satisfies a Slutsky symmetry plus a rank one factor (see Browning and
Chiappori, 1994) or, if one’s prefer to decentralise the problem to an individual level, to impose
some assumptions on the decentralisation process, as in Chiuri and Simmons (1997), and derive
extra restrictions for them.
As Chiappori (1988) shows, the simpler case of only private goods and egoistic agents has an
extra property: the aggregate collective problem is separable in consumption and leisure and
equivalent to two distinct individual utility maximisation problems, each subject to a budget
constraint defined by an exogenous function of wages and non-labour incomes, homogeneous of
degree one, called the income sharing rule, which meets the total household budget constraint.9
where the quality of child care has become a constant externality, and
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In both problems, we take:
( )
C cc m f f m m
cc
m T p k y k y k T w k T w k k p 5 4 3 2 1 0 , , + + + + + = y w f (3)
The income sharing rule (3) is assumed linear in the variables determining
household full income (in the equation y y y
f m = +  is family non-labour
income) and in the total exogenous cost of child care. This is the same form
used by FL, but with an extra term  p T
cc c 7. The main properties of the
income sharing rule are that:
“The distribution function ... must be allowed to depend on prices and total
expenditures, since these influence the distribution of ‘power’ within the
household” Browning and Chiappori (1994, p. 6).
7   The case we are dealing with is an example of a collective model extended to a household
production function for a “marketable domestic good”, which has, according to the distinction
made in Chiappori (1997), no problem of identification of the income sharing rule, since the
price for the domestic good is exogenous to the household. In our specific case, if leisure or time
spent looking after children or individual consumption were observable, then we could avoid
imposing an a priori functional form and instead identify the income sharing rule (and
preferences) up to an additive constant (see also Bourguignon et al. 1995 and Bourguignon 1999
for the specific case of caring preferences for children’s consumption).10
In this collective model, given decentralisation, cross-equation restrictions
in the two labour supplies can be derived only because of the requirement
that the income sharing rule has must satisfy the household budget
constraint. The labour supply system is thus a solution of the two
simultaneous problems:
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Substituting the income sharing rule specification, this system can be
rewritten as:
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Note that in all cases the hours offered by the husband are unaffected by
the wife’s optimal choice; and only when d
0 1 =  do the two coefficients of
the cost of child care in the labour supply functions become ‘symmetric’, as
in (2). In either case, each income source is allowed to affect individual
labour supply independently of the others, but according to the weight
attributed by the income sharing rule.
2.3. The Unrestricted Model and the Testable Restrictions
Consider the following household labour supply system:11
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The system is derived from the assumptions that the leisure of both
husband and wife is linear in the budget share and homogeneous of degree
zero in all prices and incomes (p w w y y
cc m f m , , , , ) and that each person, the
child included, has a defined time endowment, i.e. T T T
m f c , , . All prices and
incomes are in real terms; z is a vector of demographic variables and a
constant.
We call the system in (5) unrestricted because no cross-equation
restrictions are imposed. However it provides the nesting framework to test
for a unitary and for a collective model.
Three sets of restrictions characterise the unitary system (2); they are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a household utility function to be
maximised, subject to a budget constraint:
a) the income pooling hypothesis, i.e. all the household’s full income
sources have the same coefficient in the labour supplies;
b) the Slutsky matrix must be symmetric;
c) and it has to be negative semi-definite.
 By comparing the system (2) with (5) we derive the necessary and
sufficient conditions to impose on the unrestricted model with 12 coefficients
to satisfy a unitary framework, with 4 coefficients.12
TABLE 1
THE THREE MODELS COMPARED
Unrestricted Unitary Collective
a1   d d d 1 3 4 + +    f f k 1 2 1 -
a2 -d2 - f k 2 2
a3 -d2 - f k 2 3
a4   0 - f k 2 4
a5    ( ) d
o
2 1-d - f k 2 5
a6    ( ) d
m f
2 g g +    f
m
2g
b1    d d d 1 2 4 + +   g g k 1 2 2 +
b2 -d3   g k 2 1
b3 -d3 ( ) - - g k 2 3 1
b4   0   g k 2 4
b5    ( ) d
o
3 1-d    ( ) g k
o
2 5 1 + -d
b6    ( ) d
m f
3 g g +   g
f
2g
Note:  The first column lists the parameters of the unrestricted system (5); the second, those of the
unitary model (2); the third, those in the collective system (4).
These conditions translate into the following testable sets:
























                        


























c) negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix:
0 1 £ < ai   0 1 £ < bi    with  i=1,...,5.
To test whether the restrictions implied by the collective model are valid,
we first test some cross-equation restrictions that allow us to identify all the
coefficients of the income sharing rule appearing in system (4), except the
constant term. We thus derive the coefficients of each individual utility
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f m y = - .
Comparing (4) with the unrestricted system, we obtain three restrictions

































































We also test whether the weight of each individual income included in the
























In other words, we test whether the income sharing rule, identifiable with
conditions d) satisfies the pooling hypothesis.
3. The Stochastic Specification
The sample of working couples using the market child care service has
two variables, female labour supply and demand for formal child care, both
truncated at zero level. Therefore, after considering an additive error term in
each labour supply equation, capturing both measurement error and
unobservable variations in preferences, we must deal with the selection bias
caused by this truncation level.
Heckman’s two-step procedure provides consistent estimates of a
truncated regression, by conditioning them on a previous estimation of the
reduced form of the decision-making process that generates the same
variable. However, in selectivity problems it is important to determine
whether inclusion in the sample is the result of a single binary decision, or if
it is the result of a single binary variable arising from more than one binary
decision. If the decision-making process is incorrectly taken as a univariate
probit model, then one would estimate incorrect sample selectivity regressors
for the labour supply equation. The difficulties of providing satisfactory
empirical evidence supporting a structural model of labour supply for
households with young children might be related to this deficiency.
From the analysis in section 1, it follows that the simultaneous household
decisions on wife’s participation status and formal child care are determined
by: individual or household preferences, price and wage values, which
implicitly involve such variables as local labour and the child care market
conditions, and the availability of informal child care. We thus assume two
latent variables (I I w cc
* * , ) in reduced form, capturing the participation decision15
and the decision to buy formal child care in each family; and we define two
distinct female labour supplies expressed in a generic form
8:
I w w w
* ' = - Z a e
Icc cc cc
* ' = - Z a e
h u
f f * ' = + X b
where the vector of random errors  [ ] e e e ” w cc
f u , ,  is distributed as a









































is the variance-covariance matrix (in the last expression S wcc is 2x2 and Sh is
a scalar). The vector Z  includes household demographic characteristics and
characteristics of the labour and child care markets. We also construct a
dichotomous variable I j, with j=w,cc such that I I j j = ￿ ‡ 1 0
*  and
I I j j = ￿ < 0 0
* ; this indicates which alternative is chosen in each equation.
[ ] X w T z
' '
, , , , , ” y y p
m
cc  are the regressors in the wife's labour supply derived
in section 1.
Then, we can observe the wife’s labour supply as the following:
h h
f f =
*       if       Iw
* > 0 and Icc
* > 0 or if   Iw
* > 0 and Icc
* £ 0 (6)
= 0            otherwise
8  FL use Heckman (1979)’s two-step procedure to estimate the two labour supplies, thus
correcting the wife's hours-of-work equation for selection bias, after which they test the
restrictions derived from both the unitary and the collective model. To test the three models in
the case of a pre-school child, we generalise the FL approach to the case of two joint decisions
both related to the wife's time endowment, i.e., those on participation and on child care.16
The log-likelihood function
9, describing the joint probability of the events
in (6), can be decomposed into a “the selection model”, where only the
parameters ( ) a r j,  have to be estimated, and a “conditional outcome
model”, which estimates the parameters vectors b  and the covariances
Swcch, holding ( ) a r j,  fixed at the estimated values ( ) $ , $ a r j . In the labour
supply equation h
f *, the conditional mean of the disturbance term will be
given by the following expressions
10:
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Given consistent estimators of the reduced-form parameters, one can
obtain consistent estimators of the expressions in brackets in (7) and (8).
9  See Appendix 1.
10  The subscript 2 denotes bivariate and f(.) the density function.  ( ) () F ￿ ￿ ,f are respectively the
normal c.d.f. and p.d.f.17
These can be added to the labour supply equations, as “sample selectivity
regressors”: they asymptotically purge the equations of selectivity bias
11.
We have not yet considered the husband’s labour supply. This variable is
not truncated, but its disturbances are assumed to be correlated with the
wife's error term. A strong correlation would make it worth investigating the
effects of the sample selection regressors on the husband equation as well.
We do this, by testing for the null hypothesis that s s cch
m
wh
m = = 0 0 ,  and for
misspecification.
Another relevant consideration is that wage rates, non-labour incomes,
and child care expenditures are not exogenous to hours of work. FL list
various reasons for considering the first two sets of variables as endogenous;
for the wage rate, division bias, since this is a derived variable (yearly after-
tax labour earnings divided by the product of working weeks per year and
working hours per week), and unobservable components (e.g., preferences
for work) that might influence both wage and hours. Individual non-labour
income could include endogenous components (e.g., it could come from
labour income savings). Finally, as the next section will describe, the market
for child care in Italy is extremely heterogeneous, so the hourly cost of child
care can be interpreted as a random variable depending on socio-economic
and political variables that affect the consumer’s choice bundle. Moreover,
since in the collective model the total cost of formal child care is an
explanatory variable for the income sharing rule, regardless of whether the
family actually uses the service, one must have a measure of the predicted
cost for households with zero demand. All these variables are accordingly
instrumented with exogenous socio-demographic and regional variables.
In short, the three labour supply systems are estimated each one with a
three-step procedure: first, the bivariate probit in reduced form and the
bivariate inverse of Mill's ratio in brackets in (7)-(8) are computed; second,
all the instrumental variables are used to estimate the household’s total and
the husband’s non-labour income, the husband’s and wife's wage rates, and
11 Connelly (1992) and Jenkins and Symons (1995) estimate the female participation decision
conditioned on a previous joint estimation of that equation and the cost of child care assumed
bivariate normally distributed. Their analysis differs from ours in that they assume child care
cost to be conditional on the woman participating in the labour market, because of the type of
data they use. This is not the case of our data set, and we take it into account.18
the hourly price of child care. For each of the last two variables we use as
regressors, the univariate inverse of the Mill's ratio derived from the marginal
distributions of the multivariate normal  ( ) N
f
3 0,S , to correct for selection
bias. Third, using their estimates to provide fitted values to replace the
endogenous variables, the two labour supply equations are estimated by
maximum likelihood.
4. Data Description
The data set used in this study is the Bank of Italy’s biannual Survey of
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This is the most comprehensive
survey of micro data on income and wealth in Italy, covering the socio-
economic status, labour and non-labour income and wealth of more than
8,000 Italian households (24,000 individuals). Moreover, the survey for 1993
has two special sections on public and private services, giving data on the
quality of services used and actual costs. Since our focus is on the
household’s simultaneous decision process on labour supply and child care,
we restrict the analysis to 1993 data (for 8,089 households).
Italian family structures have been affected by significant demographic
changes since the eighties (a dramatic fall in the birth rate, a pronounced
decline in the share of households with 5 or more members, and a
simultaneous rise of single-person households)
12. Even so 72.76 percent of
households in the Bank of Italy sample were married couples, a relatively
high percentage compared with other western countries.
The households with at least one pre-school child numbered 1,114, but, to
ensure the reliability of data on income and hours of work we have restricted
the sample to 705, excluding the self-employed and households with an
unemployed head or wife who is looking for work. The final sample thus
represents only 8.71 percent of the total data set and 11.98 percent of
married couples, percentages that reflect the very low fertility rate in Italy
during the nineties.




Husband’s Age           36.940    (5.935)
Wife’s Age          32.76    (5.444)
Children             1.905
      0-2 years             0.655
      3 –5 years             0.584
     6 –19 years             0.583
Other Adults             0.064
Household Non- Labour Income (NLI)      3,747.600  (4,732.45)
NLI Attributed to the Husband       2,993.100  (4,078.56)
Husband’s Hourly Wage  6.852        (2.65) *
Wife’s Hourly Wage           6.652        (3.99) *
Husb.’s Weekly Hours of Work           39.71        (7.95) *
Wife’s Weekly Hours of Work          33.111        (8.73) *
Note: The table reports the main household characteristics. In the table mean (standard deviation);
nominal variables in euro.
*   Sub-sample of households with working wife.
Mean and standard deviation of the main demographic variables are
summarised in Table 2. The mean household in our restricted sample has
3.96 members; 77.44 percent have only one pre-school aged child, but more
than half have children of other age groups. Only 6.38 percent of the families
live with other adults (e.g., grandparents or relatives). Non-labour income is
the sum of the income from both financial and real assets, pensions and
allowances. They are all individual variables, but, in the survey a large share
of household income is often attributed to the household head. Testing,
among other hypotheses, for the relevance of non-labour income distribution
within a household might then be conditioned by the type of data on
individual non-labour income. In any event Del Boca (1997) finds that the
non-labour income distribution does affect the labour supply of all20
demographic groups in the Bank of Italy survey, except households with
young children.
The sub-sample of families with both spouses working amounts to nearly
44 per cent of the total (Table 3). For this group the husband's wage rate and
working hours are on average slightly higher, and with a much lower
variance than the wife's wage.
TABLE 2.A
SAMPLE STATISTICS
Child Care Costs** max. 4 hours/ day max. 8 hours/ day
Crèche (0-2)
        Private 228.88 (370.05) 682.24 (758.52)
        Public 98.86  (372.84) 592.27 (784.76)
Nursery School (3-5)
              Private 210.71 (362.11) 474.13 (472.12)
             Public 44.90 (126.06) 250.22 (299.87)
Note: Mean annual per-child costs in euros (standard deviation in parentheses).
** Sub- sample of households using formal child care
As regards formal child care, the two special survey sections on private
and public services give data on the number of children using crèches and
nursery schools and the total annual cost, distinguishing between those who
do not use the canteen (maximum of 4 hours a day) and those who do (up to
8 hours). Data on hiring and cost of nannies are not collected, nor is there
data on the possibility of relatives looking after children. However, the lack
of observability on nannies would not appear to affect the validity of the tests
greatly, since in 1993 a very low percentage of households reported some
expenditure on domestic services (a broader category than nannies alone), in
budget survey of the National statistics office, ISTAT. Only 67 out of 2,650
households with more than two members and at least one pre-school child;
this group had a very high total expenditure level.21
TABLE 3
SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY USE OF FORMAL CHILD CARE AND WIFE'S PARTICIPATION DECISION
Working Not Working Total
Child Care 26.81 % 27.38 % 382
No Child Care 17.16 % 28.65 % 323
Total     310     395 705
54 percent of our sample use formal child care (see Table 3). The age of
the child seems to influence the choice of using or not using formal child care
(34 percent for crèches, 66 percent for nursery schools). The wife's
participation decision does not make the difference; the most plausible
explanation appears to be the local availability of formal child care: on
average formal facilities can meet 50 percent of the potential demand adding
up both age groups, but crèches can only cover 5.5 percent, with sharp
geographical disparities (capacity ranging from 1-2 per cent in some regions
in the South, to 20 percent in Emilia Romagna)
13. The composition of child
care use and participation decision (only 22.2 percent of housewives use the
crèche service, but 64.8 percent enrol their children in nursery school) makes
clear the predominance of the work-related component in the decision at
crèche age.
Table 2.A presents mean and standard deviation of the costs per child,
distinguishing between the type of service: public or private, nursery school
or crèche. The sample is representative of the Italian child care market,
which is heavily local. The public service is usually subsidised by the city
government, and the lack of national regulations causes great variability in
tariff system adopted
14. The private sector is not affected by price
competition with the public service, since its niche market usually consists of
high income families. Moreover the cost of child care, which is low on
average, also depends on age: crèches generally cost more nursery schools.
13  ISTAT (1995 b, c, d).
14  See CER-CNEL Survey Report (1997), chapter 6.22
All these factors explain the high variance in the observed costs for each
type of school; and it is useful to note them for the empirical estimation of
expenditure on child care before testing the different structures of household
labour supply.
5. Empirical Results
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(9)
l l
f  (with l=w, cc) are the inverse of the Mill ratio in equations (7) and (8), in
squared brackets, and individual hours of work are assumed linear in labour
income
15.
The procedure is in three steps:
1) a bivariate probit estimate for the two decision choices, expressed in
reduced form;
2) determination of the predicted values of some of the regressors on
labour supply that could cause problems of endogeneity;
3) estimation of a system of labour supplies, for the husband and the wife.
The inverse of the Mill ratio derived from the first step is used to correct
15  In Figures A.1 in Appendix 2, we plot hours of work against individual wage rates: in both cases
there is a clear monotonic and negative relation, precluding misspecification.23
for the selection bias in the wife's labour supply due to truncated work
hours and demand for child care at zero.
We then investigate the validity of the unitary and of the collective model,
testing for the coefficient restrictions derived in section 2.
5.1. Bivariate Probit Estimation
Table 4 displays parameter values and standard errors for the joint
estimation of the two decisions (wife's participation and use of formal child
care), both in reduced form
16.
The wife's participation decision seems determined above all by education,
age and husband's occupation; the higher the wife’s educational attainment
the more likely that she will decide to work; the positive sign of the age
coefficient may also be implicitly related to education, since investment in
human capital usually delays marriage and childbirth. Moreover, since people
tend to choose spouses with similar levels of education, the husband’s being
a white-collar worker determines a higher probability of the wife’s
participating.
Whether the youngest child is of the crèche age (0-2) or of the nursery
school age does not seem to be relevant; but, this is not true of the number of
children, disaggregated into pre-school and school -age. The higher the
number of children, the more unlikely the wife’s working.
Even though the presence of another adult (either working or retired) in
the household does not to appear to be important, the negative sign and the
high significance of the migration dummy, which takes the value 1 when
either spouse lives in a different province from their home town, suggests
16  Each probit equation has been tested for heteroskedasticity (Lagrange Multiplier test statistic
( ) c 5
2 =8.5487,  ( ) c 5
2 =4.4965, respectively for the participation and for the child care equation),
misspecification (Reset test, t-ratio of the predicted squared -0.381 and -0.858 respectively) and
normality (Orme (1988) Information Matrix test: respectively,  IM1  ( ) c 2
2 2788 = . ;  IM2
( ) c 2
2 2887 = .  for the participation equation;  IM1  ( ) c 2
2 1037 = . ;  IM2  ( ) c 2
2 1033 = . , for the
child care equation).24
that unavailability of help from relatives reduces the probability of the woman
working.
Finally, among the variables that denote labour market characteristics, the
pattern of the geographical dummies is interesting: they are all negative
except for the Northwest, where there are more employment opportunities
and a more expensive life-style.
The decision to buy formal child care seems to be affected by the age and
number of children. The probability of using a market service increases when
the child is aged 3-5 and when the family has more than one pre-school child.
It decreases if there are older children, especially more than one, since they
can be of help to the mother. This is a result also found in Ribar (1992).
Economic variables relating to income (husband's occupation and wife's
potential, i.e. her education) are not significant, even though they have the
expected sign. This weakens the assumption of perfect substitutability made
in section 2, which implies that the decision on the form of child care is
driven by a comparison between the price of the service and the woman's
wage rate. The actual evidence would suggest imperfect substitutability,
bringing other factors into the decision-making process.
The migration dummy and the presence of other adults, considered as
indirect measures of the availability of informal child care have the right sign,
but one might have expected a higher level of significance. On the other hand
we should be careful in drawing conclusions, since the sample of those not
using nurseries or crèches, includes households that are potential users of
nannies, another unobserved variable.
Examining the market characteristics, the probability of using the market
service increases with its availability, an index of the local level of
competition and efficiency; the positive sign of the coefficient for the
unemployment rate may reflect public policy variables: the areas with higher
unemployment might be those with greater public intervention, hence
stronger subsidies for public services. Finally, the common negative sign on
all geographical variables is explained by the relation with the reference
category: the sub-sample of households in the Northeast shows a higher
probability of using the market service.25
TABLE 4
BIVARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR THE PROBABILITY OF WIFE’S BEING EMPLOYED AND OF
HOUSEHOLD’S PURCHASING CHILD CARE, IN REDUCED FORM.
Participation Child Care
Variable Param. (std. err.) Param. (std. err.)
Constant -2.474 (1.058)   *** -2.798 (1.025)   ***
Age  0.024 (0.013)   **  0.015 (0.012)
Education: Junior High School Or High School  0.771 (0.237)   ***  0.183 (0.182)
                            Degree Or Higher  1.987 (0.320)   ***  0.176 (0.245)
Husband's Occupation:  Skilled Blue Col.  0.137 (0.210) -0.167 (0.198)
                                      White Col.  0.617 (0.213)   *** -0.055 (0.203)
Youngest Child Aged: 0-2 Years (Not Only Child)  0.055 (0.233)  0.149 (0.222)
                                 3-5 Years  0.223 (0.447)  0.211 (0.465)
Number Of Pre-School Children: 2 -0.387 (0.224)   **  1.321 (0.212)   ***
                                            3 Or More -0.286 (0.522)  1.000 (0.484)   **
                                            1 Aged 3-5 -0.157 (0.413)  0.863 (0.427)   **
Number Of School-age Children:  1 -0.287 (0.166)   ** -0.201 (0.148)   *
                                              2 Or More -0.169 (0.213) -0.335 (0.213)   *
Other Adults In The Household: Working -0.460 (0.773) -0.070 (0.487)
                                            Retired -0.251 (0.268)  0.050 (0.190)
Geographical Area:            Northwest  0.313 (0.193)   * -0.285 (0.187)   *
                                          Centre -0.410 (0.220)   ** -0.363 (0.231)   *
                                          South -0.559 (0.278)   ** -0.398 (0.283)   *
                                         Sicily and Sardinia -0.644 (0.329)   ** -0.844 (0.327)   ***
Type of area
(1) :             Town -0.040 (0.170)  0.155 (0.173)
                                     City -0.125 (0.137)  0.058 (0.144)
Migration Dummy
(2) -0.446 (0.182)   ***  0.080 (0.160)
Unemployment Rate by Province
(3) -0.031 (0.052)  0.102 (0.051)   **
No. Of Private Nursery and Crèche Places
     Per 10 Children Aged Under 5, by Province  0.208 (0.181)  0.268 (0.174)   *
No. Of Public Nursery and Crèche Places
(4)
      Per 10 Children Aged Under 5, by Province  0.207 (0.156)  0.319 (0.149)   ***
Correlation Coefficient (r) 0.288 (0.071)   ***
log L = -772.520; n = 705 (***: p £ 0 01 . ; **: 0 01 0 05 . . < £ p ;  *: 0 05 0 10 . . < £ p ).
Note: Reference categories for categorical variables: household living in Northeast, in a rural
area, in a rented house, with a wife with at most primary school education, not working,
one child aged 0-2, and unskilled blue-collar husband.
(1)  Classes of inhabitants per type of area: 20,000-500,000 (town); >50,0000 (city).
(2)  It takes the value 1 if the province of the couple's birth place differs from the province where the
family was living at the time of the interview; 0 otherwise.
(3)   Source ISTAT (1995a) .
(4)   Source ISTAT (1995b, c, d).26
Finally, there is a positive correlation in the error distribution which
supports the assumption of substitutability for the formal child care for a
working mother's care
17. The values and significance of the parameters can
give more information on each decision-making process.
To summarise, the bivariate probit estimation has outlined the
simultaneous nature of the two choices and shown that demographics count,
especially in the participation decision, and that child care purchase is
influenced by the quality of the local service, measured as potential access,
more than by any financial consideration.
To address the endogeneity problem caused by some variables in the two
supply equations, we regress these on other exogenous variables, before
saving predicted values that will replace the observed ones. We instrument
the endogenous variables with indicators of economic environment and social
status (occupation, education, and household composition), chosen by
balancing the statistical properties of the model with the information content
of the variables 
18. Compared with the bivariate probit regressors, the final
set of instruments excludes the unemployment rate, the area variables and the
availability of formal child care, but includes the wife’s occupation as a
variable not influencing the simultaneous decision process on participation
and child care, but prices, wages and non-labour incomes. There are a
number of economic reasons for these identifying restrictions. Several should
be mentioned, as Italian peculiarities: namely, that wage rate is almost
entirely nationally bargained, a very marginal share varying by firm; the price
of child care is heterogeneous, as noted, but depends significantly on the
local government (captured by the geographical dummies and family
characteristics). We correct for the selection bias when estimating both the
wife’s wage and the price of child care
19. For a presentation of the results of
the second step in the estimation procedure, see Appendix 2.
17  The significant positive r estimate contrasts with what Connelly (1992) and Symons and
Jenkins (1995) find with US and UK data, respectively; however, this result with Italian data
can be explained by noticing that those mothers unexpectedly working are more likely to use the
formal structure because it is subsidised.
18  We test for heteroskedasticity and misspecification.
19  We estimate the husband's wage rate in logarithmic form, by standard OLS (results in Table
A.1); the wife's wage equation (in logs) is corrected for selection bias, but only the participation
decision is taken into account: first we estimate the reduced form by selectivity corrected OLS27
5.2.  The System of Household Labour Supply
In order to estimate the system of labour supplies starting from the
unrestricted model in (9) we fix an exogenous value for the total individual
time endowments. In the literature this variable is either estimated jointly
with the parameters or fixed exogenously
20. We choose the latter strategy
because we have problems of identification once the derived restrictions are
imposed. We assume T T
f m = = 72 as the weekly time endowment for wife
and husband and T
c = 48 as the maximum number of parental working hours
per week during which children need to be looked after
21. We also check
whether the parameter values and their significance are affected by the two
scaling values chosen
22.
In the functional form used for the utility in both the unitary and the
collective model, the household consumption, separable into the two
individuals consumption and leisure, has a subsistence level function of
demographic variables, g g
f m , . We use the instrumental variables; we must
exclude the geographical dummies and two of the couple occupation
dummies because of problems of multicollinearity, but we also check whether
these restrictions might cause misspecification. They all enter g g
f m , , in linear
form together with a constant term.
From the total sample of households with pre-school children, we extract
those with both parents working: 189 cases with Icc =1 and 121 with Icc = 0.
The lack of data on informal child care, on the time the mother spends with
and, since this method gives consistent but inefficient estimators (see Heckman,1979 and
Greene, 1981), we use them as starting values in the iterating procedure for a FIML estimation
of the log-wage equation and of the participation probit (results in Table A.2). In estimating the
hourly price of child care, the presence of cases with zero observed cost when the (public)
service is actually used prevents us from applying the same technique of the last regression.
Instead we estimate a tobit corrected for selection: we assume that the price for child care is
observed only when the dichotomous variable Icc takes the value 1; moreover, the price is
censored at the zero level, since pcc = 0 if the latent variable pcc
* £ 0 (see Table A.3 for the
empirical results). We estimate household non-labour income and the non-labour income
attributed to the husband by OLS (see Tables A.4 and A.5).
20  See Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986).
21  A condition imposed in section 1 for the solution of each theoretical model was that T T
f c > .
22  Table A.6 in the Appendix shows that the unrestricted model, re-estimated with
T T
f m = = 80 and T
c = 56 , is substantially robust to the choice of scaling values.28
the child, and on the demand for nannies has relevant implications for the
power of the tests derived for the two models. Defining the dichotomous
variable Icc as a proxy for the availability of informal child care creates a
form of misspecification in the sub-sample of households not using nursery
schools and crèches, and so not declaring any cost for this service, but not
necessarily using the informal structure. A deeper analysis of this group of
families did not reveal any peculiarity from which one can infer their
behaviour. The wife’s occupation is similar to that found in the sample of all
households with working wives. The distribution of the hours of work
offered follows the pattern of the total sample very closely. As to residence,
85.95 percent of this group also lives in the place of birth of one spouse
(86.24 percent is the percentage of the total sample), but only 3.3 percent of
them live with other adults in the family. Given the great difficulty of
evaluating the bias introduced by including the potentially heterogeneous
households that do not use nursery school or crèches, we follow the
endogenous switching
23 technique. We estimate the household labour supply
by jointly using both sub-samples, but we also check whether the conclusions
depend on the composition of the sample.
Table 5 lists the coefficients and the asymptotic standard errors
24 of the
labour supply system (5)
25. Different sources of income have distinct effects
on the two labour supplies: the husband’s is affected negatively by his own
wage rate (the intercept in the subsistence level, i.e. the inverse of the wage
rate, is positive and highly significant), but positively by the wife’s wage and
by total non-labour income. Conversely, the woman’s working hours are
influenced negatively by her own wage and also by unearned income. The
different dimension of the estimated parameters could cause the rejection of
the income pooling hypothesis.
23  See Maddala (1983) sections 9.6 and 9.7 for a discussion of this method.
24  While instrumenting the endogenous variables we should correct the standard errors. Arellano
and Meghir (1992) in Table 4.4 make a comparison of corrected and uncorrected standard errors
and show that on average the latter are about 40 percent greater. Nevertheless in our case the
correction would be exceedingly complicated, owing to the high non-linearity in some
endogenous variable estimations and to the correction terms included in various levels.
25  The Reset test statistic for misspecification allows us to reject the hypothesis that relevant
regressors have been omitted (including the selection terms s s cch
m
wh
m ,  in the men’s equation
whose coefficients were not significant, and thus were neglected). We also accept the hypothesis
of a homoskedastic distribution of the error vector.29
The lack of significance of husband’s non-labour income for both
equations is consistent with the empirical evidence in Del Boca, which finds a
similar results only among households with young children.
The labour supply system is not affected by formal child care costs; this is
due, as noted, to the low average cost but also to lack of access.
Among the demographics entering in the subsistence level, the dummy for
another adult in the household (with a negative effect on the husband’s
labour supply and positive on the wife’s) and that for migration (a positive
coefficient in both equations) are both strongly significant.
Concerning the two estimated covariances of the woman’s labour supply
error term with the disturbances of the bivariate probit, the significance of
swh
f  confirms that the two sub-samples selected, with working wife, are not
random.
Table 6 gives all the log-likelihood values obtained from the estimation of
system (5), first unrestricted and then with all the restrictions derived in
section 1. We thus obtain, for each model, the likelihood ratio. The income
pooling hypothesis, which imposes the equality of the coefficients of total
non-labour income and the spouse’s potential earned income in each
equation, must be rejected (LR  ( ) c 4
2 =10.85). The two labour supplies also
contradict the Slutsky symmetry condition. That is to say, all necessary
conditions for a unitary model are rejected by the data.
Conversely, the three restrictions imposed by the collective model cannot
be statistically rejected (LR test  ( ) c 3
2 =5.384). This holds also when we test an
extra condition, i.e. the income sharing rule being independent of the
husband’s non-labour income (k4 0 = ).
A test application of both theoretical models to the sub-sample of formal
child care users, proves that the LR test results are not influenced by the non-
observability of baby-sitting costs.30
TABLE 5
LABOUR SUPPLY SYSTEM ESTIMATES
Parameter Unrestricted Model
Husband
a1    0.012    (0.065)
a2      0.128    (0.052) ***
a3      0.014    (0.010) *
a4      0.003    (0.009)
a5      0.221    (0.675)
a6: Intercept  233.518  (55.954) ***
      Husband’s Age     -1.633    (1.421)
Husband's Educ.: Junior High / High School   -13.259  (15.663)
                         Degree / Higher Education    78.289  (37.527) **
   Wife’s Educ.: Junior High / High School    31.531  (14.753) **
                          Degree / Higher Education   -66.402  (28.355) ***
  Husband’s Occupation: Clerk    94.435  (13.749) ***
                                     Manager  175.689  (26.582) ***
  Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Col.    36.158  (16.880) **
 Other Adults In Household -276.194 (128.345) **
  Youngest Child Age: 0-2 Years    -6.357  (31.219)
                                  3-5 Years  -15.919  (28.799)
  Migration Dummy   44.191  (19.506) **
  No. Household Components: 5   46.807  (18.530) ***
                                             >5    -3.031  (43.149)
Wife
b1    0.048    (0.053)
b2   -0.045    (0.058)
b3   -0.022    (0.008) ***
b4    0.014    (0.009) *
b5    0.277    (0.311)
b6: Intercept 242.838  (54.652) ***
      Husband’s Age    3.499    (1.288) ***
Husband's Educ.:Junior High / High School  29.850  (13.653) **
                         Degree / Higher Education 124.564  (33.243) ***
   Wife’s Educ.: Junior High / High School   66.944  (15.040) ***
                          Degree / Higher Education    70.690  (30.535) ***
  Husband’s Occupation: Clerk    26.687  (12.070) **
                                     Manager    22.225  (25.359)
  Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Col.   -36.302  (15.801) **
 Other Adults In Household  290.462  (95.190) ***
  Youngest Child Age: 0-2 Years     9.760  (13.652)
                                  3-5 Years   15.957  (14.317)
  Migration Dummy   33.869  (19.859) **
  No. Household Components: 5   24.397  (19.218)
                                             >5   39.272  (37.532)
swh
f
  -0.051    (0.020) ***
scch
f
  -0.012    (0.008) *31
TABLE 6
TESTING FOR THE UNITARY AND THE COLLECTIVE MODELS
Without pooling Collective With income pooling
Unrestricted Collective with k4 0 = Unrestricted Unitary
Total sample of households with working wife (n=310)
logL 571.311    568.614 568.586 565.886 521.199
LR (dof)       5.384 (3)          5.45 (4)            10.850 (4)       100.224 (22)
Sample of households with working wife and using child care (n=189)
logL 344.755    342.979     342.330 339.171 323.667
LR (dof)       3.552 (3)        4.851 (4)            11.168 (4)          42.176 (22)
Note: The table includes values of selected log-likelihood functions and likelihood ratio statistics
(degrees of freedom in parentheses) for the total sample with both spouses working and for the
sub-sample of households using child care.
Table 7 gives the parameter estimates of the collective model, including its
special case, i.e. with the income sharing rule unaffected by the husband’s
non-labour income.
The interdependence of the labour supplies is captured in part by the
income sharing rule, defining both individual budgets, and partly also by all
household members’ decisions on the use of time, an element that is easily
neglected by a collective model with only private goods.
A deeper analysis of the empirical results highlights the lack of symmetry
in the partners’ interdependence. The presence of another adult within the
household stimulates an increase in the wife’s labour supply, by raising her
subsistence consumption level. The same variable has the opposite effect on
the husband’s work hours. The migration dummy raises the husband’s
subsistence level, but in the wife’s equation is less significant than in the
unrestricted model. The application of the collective restrictions may have
improved the quality of the estimation, since we found in the probit that the
migration condition would discourage the woman from participating in the
labour market, most likely because of the lack of help from the rest of the
family and given insufficient formal child care services.32
TABLE 7
LABOUR SUPPLY ESTIMATES: THE COLLECTIVE MODEL
Parameters Collective Model Collective Model withk4 0 =
Husband
a1    0.024    (0.064)    0.017    (0.057)
a2    0.143    (0.051) ***    0.140    (0.050) ***
a3    0.021    (0.010) **    0.019    (0.005) ***
a4   -0.002    (0.009)    0
a5   -0.493    (0.672)   -0.412    (0.564)
a6:        Intercept  257.636  (56.467) *** 257.390  (56.439) ***
             Husband’s Age   -2.280    (1.414) *   -2.187   (1.350) *
Husb.'s Educ.:Junior High / High School  -19.902  (15.591)  -18.878  (14.861)
                             Degree / Higher Educ.   58.981  (37.353) *   63.083  (32.561) **
  Wife’s Educ.: Junior High/ High School   27.475  (14.685) **   28.433  (14.080) **
                              Degree / Higher Educ.  -68.367  (28.224) ***  -67.430  (27.938) **
                   Husban d’s Occupation: Clerk  100.449  (13.685) ***   99.909  (13.455) ***
                                                      Manager  176.368  (26.459) *** 174.263  (24.946) ***
          Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Col.   42.907  (16.801) ***   41.556  (15.680) ***
                  Other Adults In Household -372.434 (127.749) *** -349.590  (79.711) ***
                   Youngest Child Age: 0-2 Years  -28.096  (31.074) -25.702  (28.995)
                                                      3-5 Years  -35.206  (28.665) -32.810  (26.438)
                                       Migration Dummy   46.755  (19.415) ***   48.815  (17.474) ***
                    No. Household Components: 5   42.604  (18.444) ***   44.322  (16.991) ***
                                                                 >5   -32.337  (42.948)  -24.061  (23.671)
Wife
b1    0.982    0.982
b2    0.024    (0.045)    0.024    (0.045)
b3   -0.013    (0.003) ***   -0.013    (0.003) ***
b4    0.0001    0
b5 0.031 [0.018 if Icc = 0] 0.028 [0.015 if Icc = 0]
b6:      Intercept 240.011  (47.683) *** 239.781  (47.690) ***
          Husband’s Age   3.941    (1.146) ***    3.939    (1.146) ***
Husb.'s Educ.:Junior High / High School   29.147  (13.670) ***    29.029  (13.671) ***
                             Degree / Higher Educ. 112.113  (30.595) *** 111.767  (30.600) ***
  Wife’s Educ.: Junior High/ High School   70.521  (12.629) ***   70.502  (12.631) ***
                              Degree / Higher Educ.   95.870  (22.429) ***   95.973  (22.433) ***
   Husband’s Occupation: Clerk   29.754  (12.017) ***   29.740  (12.0191)***
                                     Manager   46.774  (22.126) **   46.529  (22.129)  **
         Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Col. -40.689  (13.912) ***  -40.610  (13.916) ***
               Other Adults In Household 211.615  (54.112) ***   212.246  (54.120) ***
                  Youngest Child Age: 0-2 Years   19.384  (12.830) *   19.161  (12.831) *
                                                   3-5 Years   23.265  (13.772) **   23.083  (13.774) **
                                    Migration Dummy  14.245  (14.707)   14.357  (14.709)
                  No. Household Components: 5   6.420  (16.683)    6.456  (16.685)
                                                                 >5 -11.803  (23.809)   -11.509  (23.813)
swh
f
 -0.051    (0.018) ***   -0.051    (0.018) ***
scch
f
 -0.007    (0.006)   -0.007    (0.006)
Note: In the table parameter values without standard error in brackets are those restricted.33
TABLE  8
INCOME SHARING RULE AND UTILITY PARAMETER ESTIMATES (ASYMPTOTIC STANDARD ERRORS)
Parameter Collective Model Collective Model withk4 0 =
Income sharing rule
k1  1.890  (0.304) ***  1.923 (0.300) ***
k2 -0.423  (0.049) *** -0.417 (0.047) ***
k3 -0.063  (0.007) *** -0.057 (0.006) ***
k4  0.006  (0.002) ***  0
k5  1.459 (11.572)  1.224 (9.740)
Husband’s utility
f1  0.662  0.664
f2  0.338  (0.040) ***  0.336 (0.039) ***
Wife’s utility
g1  0.986  0.987
g2  0.013  (0.003) ***  0.012 (0.011) ***
The results for the collective model are strengthened by the derivation of
the parameters and the asymptotic standard errors (obtained by the ‘delta
method’) of the income sharing rule (see Table 8). Those of the collective
model without income pooling are very similar to those of the collective
model with the added assumption of k4 0 = . Moreover, the parameter
estimates of each individual utility
26 satisfy the negative semi-definetness of
the Slutsky matrices. Hence all the necessary and sufficient conditions
imposed by the collective model as specified in this study are accepted by the
empirical evidence. The sign of the coefficients of the income sharing rule
implies that an increase in the husband’s wage rate tends to reduce his
transfer to the wife. An opposite, if smaller effect is found for changes in the
26  A weakness of the assumption of perfect substitutabilty of all the forms of child care is the lack
of identification of the individual utility parameter linked with the household production
function; a more general case would give a better idea of the trade-off among consumption,
leisure, and the quality of the child’s time.34
wife’s wage rate and total non-labour income. The signs of the income
sharing rule parameters are consistent with those found by FL for the sub-
sample of young couples without pre-school children, but our results have a
higher significance level.
TABLE 9
THE HOUSEHOLD LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES
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, with j=m,f) to the individual wage rates and to the
household non-labour income evaluated at the mean (asymptotic standard errors), for each of
the three models. Elasticities without standard error are those with restricted parameters.
What are the implications of adopting the collective perspective instead of
the traditional unitary one? The answer is provided by comparing the
uncompensated labour supply elasticities to changes in individual wage rates
and non-labour income in the two models (see Table 9). The unitary
approach, rejected by our data, would impose cross-elasticities, on average
negative (i.e. labour supplies are strongly substitutes for one another) and
positively-sloped labour supplies (w
j as a function of h
j, j=m,f given y).
Conversely, the collective specification and the unrestricted model estimation
we obtain two quite negative uncompensated wage elastisticities for both
husband and wife, show a dominant income effect. If the value for the
husband is consistent with international evidence (see Pencavel, 1986),35
although higher than the average, this is not true of the wife’s elasticity,
which is conventionally expected to be positive and quite sensitive to wage
changes. This result might be interpreted as reflecting a high value of time
spent in home production, which could weigh more heavily in Italy than in
other countries because of rationing of child care services. Moreover we find
that the household labour supplies are weakly complementary. Finally the
collective framework detects opposite elasticities to non-labour income:
positive for the husband and negative for the wife.
To sum up the main empirical results: the implementation of the likelihood
ratio test, the derivation of the parameters involved in the model, and the
estimation of the labour supply elasticities are all consistent in highlighting
the need for more sophisticated intra-household decision models, that take
account of the children’s effect on the decision-making process.
6. Conclusion
The previous literature has not succeeded in explaining the labour supply
behaviour of households with pre-school children. This paper presents a
nested test of both the unitary and the collective approach when the decision
on the form of child care is explicitly factored in. We find that a collective
model with partial income and time sharing cannot be rejected, whereas the
assumption of household income pooling and also of the Slutsky symmetry
condition, both required by the unitary model, are rejected by the data for
Italy. A further proxy of the misspecification created by imposing a utility
maximising framework is provided by the labour supply elasticity estimates
for both models.
Because of the simple functional form used we are not able to quantify the
importance of the quality of the time dedicated t children in household
decision-making. This is a piece of information that could be obtained by
assuming formal child care to be an imperfect substitute; and it could be of
help, for instance, in evaluating alternative policy instruments that might
influence a broad range of household decisions. Moreover, the future
availability of the time use survey will allow us to test for collective
rationality without assuming a specific functional form for preferences and
income sharing.36
Appendix 1
• • The Log-likelihood function
The framework in (6) can be translated into the following set of
probabilities:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr ' , ' ; ' , ' ; h
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Note: The two figures show a monotonic and negative relation in the wage rate for both sample
distributions of hours of work (wages in thousands of Italian lire).38
• • The endogenous variable estimation
TABLE A.1
ESTIMATES OF THE HUSBAND'S LOG WAGE RATE
Variable Parameter (standard error)
Constant  2.1964 (0.0845)        ***
Husband's Age  0.0020 (0.0023)
Husb.'s Education : Junior Hgh/High School  0.0378 (0.0326)
                                   Degree/ Higher Educ.  0.2382 (0.0568)        ***
Wife’s Education: Junior High/ High School  0.0615 (0.0308)        **
                             Degree / Higher Educ.  0.0037 (0.0577)
Husband's Occupation:  Teacher  0.5356 (0.0702)        ***
                                      Clerk  0.2251 (0.0315)        ***
                                      Manager  0.3567 (0.0548)        ***
Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Collar  -0.0973 (0.0413)       ***
                              Teacher  0.0322 (0.0460)
Youngest Child Age: (Not only child)0-2 Years  0.0393 (0.0342)
                                                     3-5 Years  0.0487 (0.0339)       *
Other Adults In The Household -0.1552 (0.0609)        ***
No. Household Components: 5  0.0624 (0.0373)        **
                                          >5 -0.0075 (0.0499)
Migration Dummy  0.0687 (0.0363)        **
Geographical Area:      Northwest -0.0606 (0.0396)        *
                                    Centre -0.0121 (0.0392)
                                    South -0.1427 (0.0371)        ***
                                   Sicily, Sardinia -0.0453 (0.0467)
3811 . 0
2 = R   n=702
Note: The table gives the estimates of the husband’s log wage rate, regressed by OLS on a selected
set of instrumental variables.39
TABLE A.2
ESTIMATES OF THE WIFE'S LOG WAGE RATE
Variable Parameter (standard error)
Constant  2.1404 (0.3164)        ***
Husband's Age  0.0057 (0.0069)
Husb.'s Education : Junior Hgh/High School -0.0294 (0.0776)
                                   Degree/ Higher Educ.  0.0256 (0.1357)
Wife’s Education: Junior High/ High School  0.1464 (0.0849)        **
                             Degree / Higher Educ.  0.2166 (0.1601)        *
Husband's Occupation:  Teacher  0.1083 (0.1985)
                                      Clerk  0.0526 (0.0819)
                                      Manager  0.0550 (0.1374)
Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Collar -0.1244 (0.0774)        **
                              Teacher  0.3389 (0.0796)        ***
Youngest Child Age: (Not only child)0-2 Years  0.0594 (0.0739)
                                                     3-5 Years  0.0089 (0.0795)
Other Adults In The Household  0.0552 (0.1772)
No. Household Components: 5 -0.0046 (0.1344)
                                          >5 -0.0865 (0.1396)
Migration Dummy  0.0589 (0.1133)
Geographical Area:      Northwest -0.0555 (0.0829)
                                    Centre -0.1278 (0.0887)       *
                                    South  0.0076 (0.1241)
                                   Sicily, Sardinia -0.0003 (0.1498)
s
w




log . L = -509237  n=307
Note: In the table the estimates of the wife’s log wage rate, regressed by ML on a selected set of
instrumental variables, and corrected for selectivity in the participation decision.40
TABLE A.3
ESTIMATES OF THE HOURLY PRICE  OF CHILD CARE
Variable Parameter (standard error)
Constant  1.2051 (0.4782)        ***
Husband's Age -0.0011 (0.0133)
Husb.'s Education : Junior Hgh/High School -0.0910 (0.1540)
                                   Degree/ Higher Educ.  0.1228 (0.2801)
Wife’s Education: Junior High/ High School  0.0574 (0.1385)
                             Degree / Higher Educ.  0.2856 (0.2328)
Husband's Occupation:  Teacher  0.0926 (0.3787)
                                      Clerk  0.2709 (0.1389)        **
                                      Manager  0.1067 (0.2764)
Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Collar  0.0492 (0.1948)
                              Teacher -0.0381 (0.1673)
Youngest Child Age: (Not only child)0-2 Years -0.6989 (0.1986)        ***
                                                     3-5 Years -0.7647 (0.2187)        ***
Other Adults In The Household -0.1614 (0.2883)
No. Household Components: 5  0.1580 (0.1633)
                                          >5 -0.0688 (0.2955)
Migration Dummy -0.0509 (0.1517)
Geographical Area:      Northwest  0.1909 (0.1712)
                                    Centre -0.0287 (0.1663)
                                    South -0.5137 (0.1908)       ***
                                   Sicily, Sardinia -0.5083 (0.2649)       **
                s pcc
 0.7913 (0.0307)       ***
                rccpcc
 0.0812 (0.2844)
log . L = -745395  n=329
Note: The table shows the estimates by ML of the hourly price of formal child care. We use a tobit
model, since pcc = 0 if the latent variable pcc
* £ 0, and we correct for selection bias in the
decision to buy formal child care.41
TABLE A.4
ESTIMATES OF THE HOUSEHOLD'S NON-LABOUR INCOME
Variable Parameter (standard error)
Constant  0.0940 (2.2170)
Husband's Age  0.1549 (0.0609)        ***
Husb.'s Education : Junior Hgh/High School  1.6577 (0.8549)        **
                                   Degree/ Higher Educ.  5.4142 (1.4920)        ***
Wife’s Education: Junior High/ High School  0.6211 (0.8082)
                             Degree / Higher Educ.  1.1213 (1.5150)
Husband's Occupation:  Teacher -0.1708 (1.8410)
                                      Clerk  0.1206 (0.8236)
                                      Manager  2.2018 (1.4360)        *
Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Collar -1.6396 (1.0850)        *
                              Teacher -2.0385 (1.2070)        **
Youngest Child Age: (Not only child)0-2 Years  1.0771 (0.8972)
                                                     3-5 Years  1.4884 (0.8888)        **
Other Adults In The Household 13.9470 (1.5980)        ***
No. Household Components: 5  0.3787 (0.9789)
                                          >5  2.6096 (1.3030)        ***
Migration Dummy -1.8861 (0.9533)        **
Geographical Area:      Northwest -0.2164 (1.0400)
                                    Centre  1.0605 (1.0280)
                                    South -3.6091 (0.9704)        ***
                                   Sicily, Sardinia -3.4851 (1.2250)        **
R
2 02299 = .   n=705
Nota: The table shows the estimates of the household non-labour income (y/1000), regressed by
OLS on the selected set of instrumental variables.42
TABLE A.5
ESTIMATES OF THE HUSBAND'S NON-LABOUR INCOME
Variable Parameter (standard error)
Constant  1.4572 (2.0220)
Husband's Age  0.1107 (0.0555)        **
Husb.'s Education : Junior Hgh/High School  1.2620 (0.7798)        *
                                   Degree/ Higher Educ.  3.8309 (1.3610)        ***
Wife’s Education: Junior High/ High School  0.3802 (0.7373)
                             Degree / Higher Educ.  0.7306 (1.3820)
Husband's Occupation:  Teacher  1.4950 (1.6790)
                                      Clerk  0.6374 (0.7514)
                                      Manager  3.8881 (1.3100)        ***
Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Collar -1.1491 (0.9898)
                              Teacher -1.4452 (1.1010)       *
Youngest Child Age: (Not only child)0-2 Years  1.2586 (0.8185)       *
                                                     3-5 Years  1.7277 (0.8108)        **
Other Adults In The Household  2.3810 (1.4580)        *
No. Household Components: 5 -0.5087 (0.8930)
                                          >5 -1.5964 (1.1880)        *
Migration Dummy -2.2726 (0.8697)        ***
Geographical Area:      Northwest -1.8094 (0.9491)        **
                                    Centre -0.0295 (0.9375)
                                    South -3.3398 (0.8852)        ***
                                   Sicily, Sardinia -3.7596 (1.1170)        ***
R
2 01371 = .   n=705
Nota: The table shows the estimates of the husband’s non-labour income (y
h /1000) regressed by
OLS on the selected set of instrumental variables.43
• •  The labour supply estimation
TABLE A.6
LABOUR SUPPLY SYSTEM ESTIMATES WITH T T




a1    0.013    (0.059)
a2    0.136    (0.047) ***
a3    0.020    (0.010) **
a4   -0.0002    (0.009)
a5   -0.362    (0.582)
a6: Intercept 251.410  (56.260) ***
          Husband’s Age   -2.292    (1.428) *
Husb.'s Educ.:Junior High/ High School   -19.054  (15.750)
                         Degree / Higher Educ.   62.142  (37.730) **
  Wife’s Educ.: Junior High/ High School   26.892  (14.840) **
                          Degree / Higher Educ.  -72.274  (28.510) ***
   Husband’s Occupation: Clerk   99.699  (13.820) ***
                                     Manager 173.570  (26.730) ***
         Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Col.   42.800  (16.970)
               Other Adults In Household -357.180 (129.000) ***
                  Youngest Child Age: 0-2 Years  -33.674  (28.960)
                                                   3-5 Years  -26.436  (31.390)
                                    Migration Dummy   48.835  (19.610)
                  No. Household Components: 5   44.927  (18.630) ***
                                                                 >5 -24.498  (43.390)
Wife
b1    0.026    (0.053)
b2   -0.051    (0.053)
b3   -0.028    (0.011) ***
b4   0.018    (0.010) **
b5    0.589    (0.615)
b6: Intercept 221.190  (62.180) ***
          Husband’s Age    4.082   (1.503) ***
Husb.'s Educ.:Junior High/ High School   37.442  (16.130) ***
                         Degree / Higher Educ. 143.470  (39.340) ***
  Wife’s Educ.: Junior High/ High School   69.703  (15.600) ***
                          Degree / Higher Educ.   73.393  (31.090) ***
   Husband’s Occupation: Clerk   22.978  (13.280) ***
                                     Manager   22.403  (25.590)
         Wife’s Occupation: Skilled Blue Col.  -45.423  (18.250) ***
               Other Adults In Household 369.680 (134.400) ***
                  Youngest Child Age: 0-2 Years  39.742  (29.710)
                                                   3-5 Years  36.703  (32.460)
                                   Migration Dummy   32.994  (20.140)  *
                  No. Household Components: 5   25.031  (19.340)
                                                                 >5   60.432  (45.840)
swh
f
  -0.045    (0.018) ***
scch
f
  -0.007    (0.005)44
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